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IN THE COURT OF COMO~( fLE,A'fi 
CUYAHOGA C~~q Q!JIO 
I .) , p 12: 28 
CHARLES MURRAY, Special 
Administrator of the Estate of 
SAMUELH. SHEPPARD, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
THE STATE OF omo, 
Defendant 
Judge _Ronald S1:1ster L ~ . . . . , .... , -- __ , 
--1, 
> -· ,'·\ ·-' ; ,-_,_~ 
Case No. -312(3/12 
STATE'S MOTION TO 
EXCLUDE REBUTTAL 
TESTIMONY OF LABER 
Defendant, State of Ohio, through and by counsel, William D. Mason, Prosecuting 
Attorney, Cuyahoga County, Assistant Prosecutor A Steven Dever requests that this court 
exclude the testimony of Laber. The reasons and authorities for denying the admissibility of 
this evidence is outlined in the attached brief, which is incorporated by reference. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM D. MASON, Prosecuting Attorney 
of Cuyahoga County, Ohio 
,/ 
• .. . l.. 
Marilyn Barkley Cassidy 1 64 7) 
A Steven Dever (0024982) 
Cuyahoga County Prosecu r's Office 
The Justice Center, Courts Tower 
1200 Ontario Street 
(216) 443-5870 
Attorneys for Defendants 
-INTRODUCTION 
LAW AND ARGUMENT 
Rebuttal testimony is not for the purpose of bolstering a party's case in chief A 
rebuttal witness can only provide testimony in response to new matters introduced by a party 
opponent. See, Moore v. Retter (10 Dist. 1991), 72 Ohio App.3d 167, 174. The general rule is 
that: 
[a] party upon whom the affirmative of an issue rests is bound to 
give all his evidence in support of the issue in the first instance, 
and can only give such evidence in reply as tends to rebut the 
new matter introduced by his opponent. (emphasis added) 
Id. at 174. See, also, Cities Service Oil Co. v. Burkett (1964), 176 Ohio St. 449, 452 (stating 
that "[u]ndoubtedly, the proper time for the introduction of evidence in support of a litigants' 
own case is during the introduction of his evidence in chief.."); Burke v. Schaffner (IO Dist. 
1996), 114 Ohio App.3d 655 (refusing to allow rebuttal witness to testify since there was no 
"new" evidence to rebut). "A party upon whom the affirmative of an issue rests is bound to 
give all his evidence in support of the issue in the first instance, and can only give such 
evidence in reply as tends to rebut the new matter introduced by his opponent." Burke v. 
Schaffner, (1966), 114 Ohio App.3d 655, 665 [citations omitted]. 
It is anticipated that Laber will be offered to explain an "experiment" wherein he and/or 
Epstein attempted to recreate the blood marks on a watch. 
Laber' s testimony should be excluded from this trial because it is improper rebuttal 
evidence. Plaintiffs own expert, Dr. Epstein, already testified during plaintiffs case in chief 
that the spots on the watch were not spatter. Plaintiff has already presented evidence regarding 
blood spatter and cannot again revisit the issue in order to bolster his case in chief 
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-Furthermore, the State's expert, Toby Welson, stated in his pre-trial report that some 
blood on the watch was consistent with impact spatter. As a result, plaintiff knew that such 
information was going to be raised as an issue at trial, and therefore was bound to give all 
evidence in support of that issue in the first instance, i.e., during its case in chief Plaintiff, in 
fact, did so with the testimony of Dr. Epstein, and therefore cannot revisit the blood spatter 
issue on rebuttal. 
No new evidence was introduced by the State that would allow plaintiff to call Laber 
and to introduce his testimony regarding his "experiment" concerning blood spatter on a watch. 
Therefore, Laber should be prohibited from testifying as a rebuttal witness. 
Moreover, Laber's experiment is totally lacking in its reliability. See, Evid. R. 702(C) 
which states: 
(C) The witness' testimony is based on reliable scientific, 
technical, or other specialized information. To the extent that the 
testimony reports the result of a procedure, test, or experiment, 
the testimony is reliable only if all the following apply: 
(1) The theory upon which the procedure, test, or experiment is 
based is objectively verifiable or is validly derived from 
widely accepted knowledge, facts, or principles; 
(2) The design of the procedure, test or experiment reliably 
implements the theory; 
(3) The particular procedure, test or experiment was conducted 
in a way that will yield an accurate result. 
The factors enumerated in Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993), 509 U.S. 579, 
testing, peer review, error rates, and acceptability are missing. 
Here, Laber' s experiment lacks reliability for several reasons. The experiment Laber 
performed was novel; had no controls; had no peer review; and had no documentation. Absent 
these factors, the experiment was not scientifically valid. Furthermore, the watch he used was 
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-not a 1950's era watch; it was not the same brand, size, metal, crystal, or make-up of Sam's 
watch. Therefore, Laber' s experimental results should be excluded since they will not aid the 
jury in its search for the truth, as required by the Ohio Supreme Court. See /shier v. Miller 
(1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 447. 
The Court should not permit the novel "watch experiments" especially since the Court 
excluded experiments offered by defendants on the basis that they purportedly Jacked the same 
scientific indicia reliability missing in the Laber "watch experiment". Specifically, the Court 
excluded Wentzel's pillow blood drying time experiments and Loveyjoy's blunt trauma to 
skull experiments. 
Additionally, as defendant has asserted in a previous motion, Dr. Laber' s report was not 
timely submitted pursuant to the court's case management order (Loc.R.21.1 ). Pursuant to the 
court's case management order, all supplemental reports were due January 31, 2000. Dr. 
Laber's report is dated February 14, 2000 and was served upon defendant, February 17, 2000. 
"The trial court has discretion to determine whether a party has complied with Loe. R. 21.1 and 
to determine the appropriate sanction for its transgression [citations omitted] . . . we find no 
support for the motion that Loe. R. 21.1 does not apply to the production of expert reports used 
for purposes of rebuttal. Clearly by using the phrase 'all supplemental reports,' Loc.R.21.1 
makes irrelevant the intended purpose of the report." Michael Dolan v. Cleveland Builders 
Supply Co. (1993). 
In Paugh and Farmer, Inc. v. Menorah Home for Jewish Aged (1984), 15 Ohio St. 3d 
44, the court excluded the testimony of appellant's expert witness because the appellant failed 
to file an expert report within the period of time set forth in Loe. R. 21. In Weyls v. 
University Hosp.of Cleveland, (July 28, 1994), Cuyahoga App. No. 65803, the trial court's 
4 
-exclusion of a witness presenting expert testimony was upheld despite the fact that no case 
management plan was in place. The court found Loe. R. 21.1 to be self- executing and requires 
compliance by the parties, even where the court has failed to institute a case management plan. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM D. MASON, Prosecuting Attorney 
of Cuyahoga County, Ohio 
014647) 
A. Steven Dever (00249 2) 
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor's Office 
The Justice Center, Courts Tower 
1200 Ontario Street 
(216) 443-5870 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
A copy of the foregoing Motion to Exclude Testimony of Laber was served this~ 
day of April, 2000, by hand delivery, upon Terry Gilbert, at Court Room 20-B, 1200 Ontario 
Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44113. 
Kathleen A. Martin 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 
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*215399 NOTICE: RULE 2 OF THE OHIO 
SUPREME COURT RULES FOR THE 
REPORTING OF OPINIONS IMPOSES 
RESTRICTIONS AND LIMIT A TIO NS ON THE 
USE OF UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS. 
Michael DOLAN, et al., Plaintiff-Appellants, 
v. 
CLEVELAND BUILDERS SUPPLY CO., 
Defendant-Appellee. 
No. 62711. 
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Cuyahoga County. 
June 17, 1993. 
Civil appeal from Court of Common Pleas Case No. 
130,515. Affirmed. 
Daniel J. Ryan, Cleveland, for plaintiff-appellants. 
Joseph A. Farchione, Jr., Cleveland, for defendant--
appellee. 
JOURNAL ENTRY and OPINION 
NUGENT, Judge: 
I. 
**1 In June, 1987, plaintiffs-appellants Michael and 
Peggy Dolan (hereinafter "the Dolans ") filed a 
complaint against defendant--appellee Cleveland 
Builders Supply Co. (hereinafter "CBS") alleging that 
bricks manufactured by CBS and incorporated into the 
Dolans' house were not fit for their intended purpose 
and, as a result, CBS had breached an implied 
warranty. 
The record reveals that in 1977, the Dolans 
purchased five thousand bricks from CBS. Prior to 
purchasing the bricks, Mr. Dolan informed CBS that 
the bricks were for use in the construction of his 
home. Mr. Dolan was told by a representative of 
CBS that these bricks, designated as Independence 
No. 75 R, were suitable for exterior use in northern 
Ohio. 
For assistance in planning the construction of their 
home, the Dolans used the services of Mrs. Dolans' 
father, William Platten, Sr., who was a general 
contractor. Mr. Platten had "overall control" over the 
construction of the Dolans' home. The bricklayer 
employed by the Dolans was recommended to them 
by Mr. Platten, who had a long-standing business 
relationship with the bricklayer. 
The Dolans moved into their new home in 
November, 1977. In the summer of 1983, the Dolans 
noticed certain bricks were failing. The faces of some 
bricks began chipping off, a process referred to as 
"spalling." The failure was particularly acute around 
the chimney, the foundation walls, and the front 
porch. The bricks continued to deteriorate and 
affected other areas of the house as of the time of 
trial. 
II. 
After several unsuccessful trial dates, the matter was 
set for trial on September 16, 1991. 
On June 12, 1991, counsel for the Dolans forwarded 
CBS a letter informing it that the Dolans intended to 
call William Platten, Sr., William Platten, Jr., Charles 
Schulz and Richard Schulz as witnesses at trial. 
In an effort to clarify the Dolans' witness list, 
counsel for CBS forwarded a letter to counsel for the 
Dolans on June 26, 1991, which stated, in part: 
It is my understanding that Mr. and Mrs. Dolan will 
be called as lay witnesses while Mr. Manyo, 
William Platten, Sr., William Platten, Jr., Charles 
Schulz and Richard Schulz will be called as expert 
witnesses at the time of trial. So that there is no 
question regarding witnesses, please update your 
Answers to Interrogatories or confirm the validity of 
my understanding in writing. 
No response was forthcoming from the Dolans until 
the time period between August 9, 1991 and August 
21, 1991, during which time the Dolans identified the 
following individuals as witnesses: Gene Suma, 
Robert Doyle, John Wessel, Harry Ratka, Donald 
DaCond, John Adams, Chris Lopez, George Nemeth, 
Phillip Kerling, Warren Bucher, Jim Darcy, John 
Powers, Vernon L. Burdick, Walter Kuhfeld, and 
James Tann. Of these witnesses, an expert report was 
provided for Mr. Doyle, Mr. Tann and Mr. Suma. 
No information was provided regarding the remaining 
witnesses other than their names. 
On August 14, 1991, counsel for CBS forwarded a 
letter to counsel for the Dolans stating, in pertinent 
part: 
**2 If the individuals named on page 2 of your 
August 13th fax are witnesses whom you intend to 
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt. works 
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call at the trial of this matter, we are entitled to 
addresses and some brief summary of the testimony 
you expect to obtain from these individuals. If it is 
genuinely your intention to call these witnesses in 
this case, then please provide us, as soon as possible 
due to the impending trial date, with the addresses of 
these individuals and a summary of their testimony. 
Please give this your immediate attention so that, in 
the event it is necessary to depose those individuals, 
the depositions can be taken before the trial. 
We are not waiving any objection to the lateness of 
your presentation of these witnesses nor are we 
waiving any objection to them as witnesses in this 
case by making this request. 
Having received no response from the Dolans, on 
August 28, 1991, CBS filed a motion to exclude these 
witnesses from testifying at trial or, in the alternative, 
motion to continue trial. 
Additionally, on August 28, 1991, counsel for the 
Dolans faxed CBS a copy of the expert report of 
Vernon L. Burdick, a ceramics engineer. On August 
29, 1991, CBS filed a motion to exclude Vernon L. 
Burdick as an expert witness on the grounds that he 
was identified as an expert less than thirty days before 
trial. 
The Dolans did not respond to either motion to 
exclude. 
On September 17, 1991, the trial court granted both 
motions to exclude. 
III. 
At trial, the Dolans presented the testimony of six 
expert witnesses, including: 1) Steven Manyo, who 
has a degree in architecture; 2) Donald Hollenbaugh, 
who is a manager for Solar Testing Laboratories, 
which provides testing services for construction 
materials; 3) William Platten, Jr., who is a civil 
engineer; 4) William Platten, Sr., who is a general 
contractor; 5) Chris Lopez, who is a civil engineer; 
and 6) George Nemeth, who has been a bricklayer for 
the past forty-one years. (FN 1) 
Mr. Lopez testified that a representative sample of 
brick from the Dolans' home was subjected to a series 
of tests according to guidelines set by the American 
Society for Testing Materials (ASTM). On cross-
examination, Mr. Lopez indicated that ASTM sets the 
standards for the testing of construction materials. 
Further, he testified that with regard to the durability 
of a brick product, ASTM C-216 was the applicable 
standard. After reading ASTM C-216, Mr. Lopez 
testified that if the average compressive strength of a 
brick sample was greater than eight thousand PSI or 
the average water absorption was less than eight 
percent, then the test to determine the sample's 
saturation coefficient would be waived. (FN2) In light 
of the test results for compressive strength and cold 
water absorption from the Dolans' tests, Mr. Lopez 
testified that the saturation coefficient was waived in 
this matter. 
The Dolans' second expert, Steven Manyo, testified 
that he inspected the Dolans' home, inspected the 
brick and, based upon his inspection and review of 
test results, offered his opinion that the reason the 
brick was spalling was that there were laminations in 
the brick which, when water penetrated, would fill up 
with water and expand during freeze/thaw cycles. 
Mr. Manyo also testified that the bricks were 
acceptable in the industry at the time they were sold 
because they passed the standards set forth in ASTM 
C-216. On cross-examination, this statement was 
explored in further detail. Mr. Manyo testified, as 
did Mr. Lopez, that if the average compressive 
strength was greater than eight thousand PSI or the 
water absorption less than eight percent, then the 
saturation coefficient would be waived. 
**3 The Dolans' next expert, Don Hollenbaugh, 
testified that he performed a series of tests on brick 
samples from the Dolans' home. On cross-
examination, Mr. Hollenbaugh testified that the 
samples he tested conformed with ASTM standards 
for compressive strength and cold water absorption. 
The Dolans' fourth expert, William Platten, Jr., also 
testified that a representative sample of brick from the 
Dolans' home was subjected to a series of tests 
according to ASTM guidelines. Based on the 
saturation coefficient, which he calculated, Mr. 
Platten, Jr. concluded that the bricks were not suitable 
for use in northern Ohio, a severe weather area. He 
offered his opinion that the reason for the lack of 
durability was because the bricks were far too 
permeable, caused by a manufacturing defect. 
On cross-examination, Mr. Platten stated that the 
waiver provision of ASTM C-216 does not apply to 
the Dolan brick based on the fact that the brick tested 
had been used. Mr. Platten testified that ASTM 
testing methods are written for new bricks before sale. 
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt. works 
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EXPERT TO APPEAR ON BEHALF OF THE 
APPELLEE WHEN SUCH EXPERT WAS NOT 
EVEN REVEALED TO APPELLANT UNTIL SIX 
WEEKS BEFORE TRIAL OF THE ACTION. 
He stated that once bricks have failed in service, the 
tests are used to assist in determining the reason for 
their failure. 
Mr. Platten's distinction between new and used 
brick was contradicted by Mr. Willard Packman, the 
expert retained by CBS. Mr. Packman testified that 
the age of the brick or its use will not affect the 
compressive strength test, the cold water absorption 
test or the saturation coefficient. Mr. Packman 
testified that the Dolans' bricks passed both the cold 
water absorption test and compressive strength test 
and, therefore, the saturation coefficient and freeze/ 
thaw testing are waived. 
Based on his inspection of the Dolan home and the 
Solar Lab test results, Mr. Packman concluded that 
the spalling was caused by water penetration and 
freeze/thaw problems. He offered his opinion that the 
reason the brick was spalling was due to improper 
construction and, with regard to the chimney, failure 
to follow approved plans. 
In rebuttal, the Dolans presented the expert 
testimony of George Nemeth. Mr. Nemeth, a 
bricklayer for forty-one years, testified that he 
inspected the brickwork at the Dolans' home, 
including the chimney, and found it to be of good 
quality. 
At the close of all the evidence, the case was 
submitted to the jury, which entered a unanimous 
verdict for CBS. 
The Dolans timely appeal and assign three errors for 
our review. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
THE MOTION TO EXCLUDE WITNESSES IN 
THAT THERE WAS NO SHOWING OF ANY 
VIOLATION OF THE CIVIL RULES OF 
PROCEDURE NOR ANY EVIDENCE OFFERED 
IN SUPPORT OF SUCH MOTION ESPECIALLY 
WHEN SUCH ORDER HAD THE EFFECT OF 
DISMISSING THE CLAIM OF THE 
APPELLANT. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II 
THE TRIAL COURT WRONGFULLY 
EXCLUDED THE EXPERTS OF THE 
APPELLANT WHEN IT PERMITTED A NEW 
**4 We address the Dolans' first and second 
assignments of error together since the Dolans claim 
in each that the trial court erroneously excluded 
relevant evidence when it granted the defendant's 
motions to exclude. 
Evid.R. 103(A)(2) provides, in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which 
admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial 
right of the party is affected, and * * * in case the 
ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of 
the evidence was made known to the court by offer 
or was apparent from the context within which 
questions were asked. * * * 
A motion to exclude evidence, if granted, is a 
tentative, interlocutory, precautionary ruling by the 
trial court reflecting its anticipatory treatment of an 
evidentiary issue. State v. Grubb (1986), 28 Ohio 
St.3d 199, 201, 202. Accordingly, a proponent who 
has been temporarily restricted from producing 
evidence by virtue of a motion to exclude evidence 
must seek the introduction of the evidence, by proffer 
or otherwise at trial, in order to enable the court to 
make a final determination as to its admissibility and 
to preserve any objection on the record for purposes 
of appeal. Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus; 
Collins v. Storer Communications, Inc. (May 5, 
1993), Cuyahoga App. No. 55420, unreported. 
A trial court has broad discretion in the admission 
and exclusion of evidence, and a reviewing court shall 
not reverse a trial court's judgment for failure to 
admit or exclude evidence unless the trial court has 
clearly abused its discretion and the complaining party 
has suffered material prejudice. Columbus v. Taylor 
(1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 162, 164. Accordingly, we 
would not reverse the trial court's judgment unless the 
trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily or 
unconscionably in excluding the evidence and the 
complaining party has suffered material prejudice. 
Id. at 165. 
In their first assignment of error, the Dolans argue 
that witnesses listed in CBS' s motion to exclude, filed 
August 28, 1991, with the exception of Vernon L. 
Burdick and James Tann, effectively precluded them 
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from presenting a claim of fraud. (FN3) 
Our review of the record shows that the Dolans 
failed to perfect their rights to appeal the exclusion of 
the contested witnesses since they failed to proffer the 
substance of that evidence at trial. In fact, counsel for 
the Dolans specifically declined to proffer evidence 
supporting a claim of fraud prior to trial. Counsel for 
the Dolans engaged in the following dialogue with the 
court: 
MR. RYAN: I would like to address it in the 
context, a ruling was made yesterday by Judge 
Friedman in regards to the exclusion of several 
witnesses. As I indicated to the Court yesterday * 
* * generally, I would not bother this particular 
Court with a pretrial motion, with a start of trial 
motion, but this particular motion has to do with 
our ability to put on a claim that my clients are 
maintaining through me they have a valid claim. 
**5 My personal feeling is, I don't want to get into 
this, your Honor, because I spent several years on 
at least five of these cases, and I have spent a lot 
of time as to the issue of whether or not CBS had 
prior knowledge of the sale of the bricks. Mr. 
Farchione knows that I have dropped that claim on 
four other cases. I think that's a fair 
representation. 
MR. FARCHIONE: I would agree with that. 
MR. RYAN: My client, Peggy Dolan, in June, 
when we had some misunderstanding as to a 
settlement in this case, made inquiry of me what 
would be needed to prove an allegation of fraud. 
I indicated to her that we would need very strong 
evidence to show that someone within Cleveland 
Builders Supply had prior knowledge of the defect 
of the brick, that it was obvious that this defect 
was running through all of the brick and he 
continued to sell the brick. 
Mrs. Dolan on her own, without my direction, 
obtained through the summer the names of several 
witnesses and information from them. 
As she conveyed the names and addresses to me, I, 
then, immediately conveyed them to Mr. 
Farchione by August, as soon as I got them. * * * 
THE COURT: I've told you already, that's been 
ruled on. I'm not going to go back into that now. 
MR. RYAN: I understand. 
* * * 
* * * 
MR. RYAN: Your Honor, just so I can move this 
case along, rather than bother the Court with 
attempting to put on witnesses--! don't want to be 
unfair to the Court, but my understanding is that 
with the exclusion of that testimony, it's almost 
impossible for me to prove the allegations of 
fraud. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. RYAN: I'm not going to trouble the Court 
with that, but the Court understands I have the 
opportunity to appeal that ruling by Judge 
Friedman to the Court of Appeals. 
THE COURT: Of course. Of course. 
Further, the substance of the excluded evidence was 
not revealed from the context within which evidence 
was developed at trial. Compare State v. Gilmore 
(1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 190. Since the substance of 
that testimony was not revealed by proffer or 
otherwise, this court cannot determine whether its 
exclusion prejudiced the Dolans. Evid.R. 103(A). 
Accordingly, we overrule the Dolans' first assignment 
of error. 
Turning to the Dolans' second assignment of error, 
the Dolans contend that the trial court abused its 
discretion in excluding the expert testimony of Mr. 
Burdick and Mr. Tann. The Dolans argue that the 
late announcement of these expert rebuttal witnesses 
was due to the late production of the expert report of 
Mr. Willard Packman by CBS. 
Although the Dolans characterize the announcement 
of Mr. Packman as an expert for CBS as an 
"ambush," our review of the record shows that 
counsel for the Dolans consented to the late 
production of Mr. Packman's report. The record 
reveals the following: On June 11, 1991, counsel for 
CBS received a facsimile from the Dolans' counsel 
containing the expert report of William Platten, Jr., 
civil engineer. In response, counsel for CBS faxed a 
letter to the counsel for the Dolans on June 12, 1991, 
which stated, in part: 
**6 I am in receipt of your facsimile of June 11, 
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1991, containing your new expert report drafted by 
Mr. Platten [Jr.], and dated June 5, 1991. I will not 
object to the production of this report so close to 
trial, so long as I may have the house inspected, and 
produce a report by an expert in the same field as 
Mr. Platten. I would like to do this during the week 
of June 17, 1991. Please advise today, either by 
return facsimile, or by contacting my secretary. 
In response, the Dolans' counsel faxed a letter dated 
June 12, 1991 stating, in part, " * * * I have no 
objection to your having an expert review the home of 
my clients, so that he can come up with a report for 
you." 
Nothing in this train of events suggests that CBS 
"ambushed" the Dolans when it identified Mr. 
Packman as an expert on its behalf. 
With regard to Mr. Tann, the Dolans failed to 
proffer any information as to how Mr. Tann would 
support their allegations as required by Evid.R. 103. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the substance of the 
excluded evidence is contained in Mr. Tann's 
deposition testimony, which was filed with the trial 
court, we note that the trial court's exclusion of such 
evidence would not warrant reversal. At his 
deposition, Mr. Tann testified as follows: 
Q. When were you first contacted about this matter? 
A. I was contacted by Mrs. Dolan in the early part 
of 1991, probably March. 
Q. What were you asked to do, and what 
information was provided to you at that time? 
A. I was asked for information on performing an 
inspection of their residence, as far as the 
condition or existing condition of the brick in 
question. As we are a trade association of brick 
manufacturer's policy on performing inspections, it 
is a service to our member manufacturers and 
asking Ms. Dolan, the manufacturer of the brick in 
question, it was determined that they were a non-
member of ours in the past, and that we were 
unable to perform that inspection, because of our 
policies. We did, then, forward some names of 
other experts in the field that she may want to 
contact. 
* * * 
* * * 
Q. Mr. Tann, do you have any opinions relative to 
the design, the masonry work, the mortar, the 
maintenance or construction of the Dolan 
residence? 
A. I have not see the Dolan residence, and cannot 
comment on it. 
Based on Mr. Tann's own testimony, he would not 
have added any information relevant to fraud or 
whether the brick was defective. Accordingly, the 
trial court's pretrial ruling did not substantially 
prejudice the Dolans. 
As was the situation with Mr. Tann, the Dolans also 
failed to proffer any information as to how Mr. 
Burdick would support their allegations as required by 
Evid.R. 103. Assuming, arguendo, that the substance 
of the excluded evidence is contained in Mr. 
Burdick's written report, we note that the trial court's 
exclusion of such evidence was within its discretion. 
(FN4) 
Civ.R. 16 empowers courts to adopt rules regarding 
the exchange of expert reports of witnesses to be 
called at trial. Former Loc.R. 21.1 of the Cuyahoga 
County Court of Common Pleas, General Division, 
provided as follows: 
**7 (A) Since Ohio Civil Rule 16 authorizes the 
court to require counsel to exchange the reports of 
medical and expert witnesses expected to be called 
by each party, each counsel shall exchange with all 
other counsel written reports of medical and expert 
witnesses expected to testify in advance of the trial. 
The parties shall submit expert reports in accord 
with the time schedule established at the Case 
Management Conference. The party with the 
burden of proof as to a particular issue shall be 
required to first submit expert reports as to that 
issue. Thereafter, the responding party shall submit 
opposing expert reports within the schedule 
established at the Case Management Conference. 
Upon good cause shown, the court may grant the 
parties additional time within which to submit expert 
reports. 
(B) A party may not call an expert witness to testify 
unless a written report has been procured from the 
witness and provided to opposing counsel. It is 
counsel's responsibility to take reasonable measures, 
including the procurement of supplemental reports, 
to insure that each report adequately sets forth the 
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expert's opinion. However, unless good cause is 
shown, all supplemental reports must be supplied no 
later than thirty (30) days prior to trial. The report 
of an expert must reflect his opinions as to each 
issue on which the expert will testify. An expert 
will not be permitted to testify or provide opinions 
on issues not raised in his report. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The trial court has discretion to determine whether a 
party has complied with Loc.R. 21.1 and to determine 
the appropriate sanction for its transgression. Pang v. 
Minch (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 186, 194. Such 
determinations will not be reversed on appeal absent 
an abuse of discretion. Id. at 194. 
In this case, we cannot conclude that the trial court 
abused its discretion in excluding the expert opinion 
of Mr. Burdick. Despite the Dolans' argument to the 
contrary, we find no support for the motion that 
Loc.R. 21.1 does not apply to the production of 
expert reports used for purposes of rebuttal. Clearly, 
by using the phrase "all supplemental reports," 
Loc.R. 21.1 makes irrelevant the intended purpose of 
the report. Absent a demonstration of how the Dolans 
were prejudiced by the exclusion of Mr. Burdick's 
expert opinion, this court will not endeavor to create 
reasons. We conclude that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in excluding the expert testimony 
of Mr. Burdick. 
The Dolans' second assignment of error is not well 
taken and is overruled. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT 
CHARGING THE JURY THAT THE AMERICAN 
STANDARD TESTING METHODS (ASTM) HAD 
NO RELEVANCY AND SHOULD NOT BE 
CONSIDERED IN ARRIVING AT THEIR 
VERDICT AND FURTHER SHOULD HA VE 
INSTRUCTED THE JURY THAT THE WAIVER 
CLAUSE CONTAINED IN EXHIBIT 27 WHICH 
WAS C-216 OF THE ASTM HAD NO 
APPLICATION NOR RELEVANCY IN THE 
TRIAL OF THE ACTION. 
In their third assignment of error, the Dolans 
contend it was that the trial court erred in failing to 
instruct the jury that the ASTM standards did not 
apply, in any manner, in this case. The Dolans argue 
that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence 
regarding ASTM standards and, therefore, the trial 
court had a duty to give a curative instruction to the 
jury regarding their inapplicability, notwithstanding 
that fact that counsel never requested a curative 
instruction and failed to object to the omission of a 
curative instruction. Moreover, it was the Dolans 
who introduced the ASTM standards as an exhibit. 
**8 Civ.R. 5l(A) provides as follows: 
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time 
during the trial as the court reasonably directs, any 
party may file written requests that the court instruct 
the jury on the law as set forth in the requests. 
Copies shall be furnished to all other parties at the 
time of making the requests. The court shall inform 
counsel of its proposed action on the requests prior 
to counsel's arguments to the jury and shall give the 
jury complete instructions after the arguments are 
completed. The court also may give some or all of 
its instructions to the jury prior to counsel's 
arguments. The court need not reduce its 
instructions to writing. 
On appeal, a party may not assign as error the 
giving or the failure to give any instruction unless 
the party objects before the jury retires to consider 
its verdict, stating specifically the matter objected to 
and the grounds of the objection. Opportunity shall 
be given to make the objection out of the hearing of 
the jury. 
The rationale behind this rule is two-fold: the object 
of the portion of the rule requiring the parties to enter 
their objections to the charge before the jury retires to 
consider the verdict is to allow the court, while it still 
has the chance, the opportunity to correct the error or 
omission before the jury begins its deliberations. 
Presley v. Norwood (1973), 36 Ohio St.2d 29. The 
object of the portion of the rule requiring the court to 
inform counsel, prior to jury argument, of its 
proposed action upon requested instructions is to 
require the judge to inform the trial lawyers what the 
charge is going to be so they may conform their 
arguments to law and intelligently argue the case to 
the jury. 
Where a party fails to interpose a specific objection 
to the court's instructions, the error or omission is 
waived, absent a finding of plain error. Reichert v. 
Ingersoll (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 220. Although the 
plain error doctrine is a principle applied almost 
exclusively in criminal cases, the Ohio Supreme Court 
has stated that the doctrine may also be applied in 
civil causes, even if the party seeking to utilize the 
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doctrine failed to object to the court's charge to the 
jury. Id. at 225. 
In order for an unrequested, unobjected-to jury 
instruction to rise to the level of plain error, it must 
appear on the face of the record not only that error 
was committed, but that except for the error, the 
result of the trial clearly would have been otherwise 
and that not to consider the error would result in a 
clear miscarriage of justice. State v. Underwood 
(1983), 3 Ohio St.3d 12, paragraph one of the 
syllabus. 
The Ohio Supreme Court has made it clear that 
courts of appeals should take notice of plain error 
charily, see State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91, to 
correct only particularly egregious errors--those 
errors that "would have a material adverse effect on 
the character and public confidence in judicial 
proceedings." Schade v. Carnegie Body Co. (1982), 
70 Ohio St.2d 207, 209. See, also, Yungwirth v. 
McAvoy (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 285, 288. 
**9. In the instant case, the trial court did not err in 
failing to instruct the jury that ASTM standards did 
not apply. 
In an effort to show that the bricks were defective 
when they purchased them in 1977, the Dolans 
presented evidence that in 1988, the bricks failed to 
conform to ASTM requirements for absorption and 
saturation. Mr. Platten, Jr. testified that based on the 
bricks' extremely high saturation coefficient, they 
were not suitable for use in northern Ohio, a severe 
weather area. 
In direct contradiction to this testimony, CBS 
presented evidence that the bricks met ASTM 
standards for compressive strength and water 
absorption and, therefore, according to ASTM C-216, 
CBS was not required to calculate the saturation 
coefficient. This evidence was not offered by CBS, as 
the Dolans could have us believe, to mislead the jury 
into thinking that the waiver provision of ASTM 
C-216 acted as a legal bar to their consideration of the 
evidence. Rather, CBS offered this evidence to show 
that the bricks did not contain a manufacturing defect. 
As the evidence established that ASTM standards 
were relevant to a determinative issue, that is whether 
the bricks contained a manufacturing defect at the 
time they were sold, we cannot say that the trial court 
erred in failing to give a curative instruction regarding 
their applicability. 
Accordingly, the Dolans' third assignment of error 
is not well taken and is overruled. 
PATTON, P.J., and BLACKMON, J., concur. 
N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third 
sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see 
Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this 
document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at 
which time it will become the judgment and order of 
the court and time period for review will begin to run. 
FN 1. The trial court permitted the Dolans to present 
the expert testimony of Mr. Lopez in their case-in-
chief and Mr. Nemeth on rebuttal, notwithstanding 
the fact that both individuals had been excluded 
when CBS's August 28, 1991 motion to exclude was 
granted. 
FN2. ASTM C-216 provides in pertinent part as 
follows: 
4.1 Durability. * * * If the average compressive 
strength is greater than 8,000 psi (55.2MPa) or the 
average water absorption is less than 8.0% after 
24-h submersion in cold water, the requirement for 
saturation coefficient shall be waived. 
4.2 Freezing and Thawing. * * * Note 1-Brick are 
not required to perform to the provisions of 4.2 
[freezing and thawing], and these do not apply 
unless the sample fails to conform to the 
requirements for absorption and saturation 
coefficient prescribed in Table II or the strength and 
absorption requirements in 4 .1. 
FN3. This court has not been asked to determine 
whether the complaint of the Dolans sufficiently sets 
forth a claim of fraud within the meaning of Civ.R. 
9(A). See Baker v. Conlan (1990), 66 Ohio App.3d 
454. 
FN4. In Mr. Burdick's written opinion, he concluded 
that the bricks were unsound and not durable enough 
for use in northern Ohio. He offered the opinion 
that the reason for the lack of durability was 
immature firing temperatures at the time of 
manufacture. 
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt. works 
